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JUDICIAL PRACTICE---COURTS MILITARY
AND CIVIL: A CONTRAST.
MAJOR ROBERT R.

FREEMAN, PRESIDENT,

MiILWAUKZE BAR ASSOCIATION.
The members of the Wisconsin bar have performed a great
and patriotic work during these trying times. They have not
spared themselves, but have given gladly of their time and have
sacrificed much. They have performed their work cheerfully without attempting to advertise or commercialize it, and only now is
the general public beginning to realize that the success of the draft
was due to the unselfish efforts of the legal profession. The
lawyer raised a draft army without friction and did it without
seeking publicity. It is something to be proud of and the knowledge of that patriotic act well done will bring lasting happiness
to those who participated in it. Let me state, too, that the war was
not won by any particular division or any particular set or class
of men. It was won by the co-operation of all, and I hope in
years to come invidious comparisons will not be made, for it
should be remembered that the civilian contributed just as much
to the success of the war as did the man in uniform. The one
could not have existed without the other. Each worked to a
common end and each gave his best, and the will to do that work
for which each was best fitted had much to do with the final
result.
The controversy between General Crowder and General Ansell
has been given so much newspaper publicity that perhaps everyone is more or less familiar with the faults to be found in the
present court martial system. I shall try to avoid discussing that
which has been printed in the newspapers.
While the present system is certainly to be condemned, if for
no other reason than because of the autocratic power vested in
one man, yet it does possess several distinct virtues which appeal
to me strongly and which I propose to discuss here in the hope
that the bench and bar of Wisconsin may profit somewhat from
such discussion.
A general court mArtial is composed of not more than thirteen, nor less than five officers. The power to appoint or convene
a general court is given to the President and to certain named
officers of the army, such as the commanding general in the
field, department commanders and commanding officers of camps
and districts by the 8th Article of War. In practice a general
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court is convened substantially as follows: Let us assume charges
have been preferred and a number of men are awaiting trial by
general court martial in the Eastern Department. The commanding general of that department publishes an order detailing
thirteen officers to sit as the court in the trial of these cases. He
also details a trial judge advocate and an assistant trial judge
advocate. In theory the trial judge advocate is both the prosecuting attorney and legal advisor of the court and he is also supposed to advise with and prottct the rights of the accused. The
ranking officer of the court is called the President, and when an
officer is on trial, the court is usually composed of officers who
outrank him. After the court is detailed, the trial judge advocate arranges the dates of trial and notifies the accused thereof
and also gives him an opportunity of being represented by counsel. The accused may select an officer of the army to defend him
and the officer so selected is detailed for that particular purpose.
If he prefers, he may secure civilian counsel, but the Government
does not defray the expenses of such counsel and rarely do you
find a civilian defending an accused in a general court martial.
On the day of trial, the members of the court, the trial judge
advocate and his assistant, the accused and his counsel and the
reporter are all present. The proceedings are conducted with
the greatest formality. The majesty of the law is revealed in
every act. The court maintains its dignity throughout the trial
and indecorum on the part of the judge advocate, counsel or spectators is unheard of. No matter how trivial the offense, this form
is adhered to, and the moment one enters the court room, one
realizes that the court is sitting for a serious purpose. Whether
the members thereof be young or old, they realize the importance
of their position for the time being and uphold the dignity of the
court to the fullest extent. It is a dignity which commands respect and a dignity which many civilian judges and lawyers could
emulate with considerable profit. Let me briefly sketch a trial to
bring home the atmosphere of a general court martial. On the
day of trial the judge advocate announces his readiness to proceed, whereupon the accused formally introduces his counsel to
the court. The reporter is sworn in by the' judge advocate. The
order appointing the court is read to the accused and he is asked
if he objects to being tried by any member thereof. If he replies
in the negative, the trial judge advocate swears in the court.
This is an extremely impressive ceremony. The officers of the
court are equipped with swords and usually gloved. When they
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rise to be sworn, everyone in the courtroom rises with them. The
judge advocate calls each officer by name and collectively administers the oath prescribed by the manual. After the court is
sworn, the president thereof administers the prescribed oath to
the judge advocate and his assistant. All remain standing during
this ceremony and continue standing until the president and the
court resume their seats. Even in the seating of the court ceremony is observed. The president sits in the middle, facing the
witness chair; to his right is seated the next ranking officer, to
his left the next, and so on down to the junior officer present.
Can you imagine how a proceeding of this character impresses
the general public? Respect for law and order is driven home.
For the time being, the court is regarded as something apart from
the general public. Its seriousness is impressive and the very
solemnity of the occasion breeds respect for a military court. I
wish the same respect were shown to civilian judges as to members of a general court martial. After the ceremonies just described, the accused is ordered to rise and the charges and specifications are read to him by the judge advocate. If he pleads guilty,
the president of the court fully explains the nature and effect of
such a plea, so that only in rare instances does an accused enter
a plea of guilty without full knowledge of his rights. If a plea
of not guilty is entered, the judge advocate reads the paragraphs
of the manual giving the gist of the offenses with which the accused is charged. This is for the instruction of the court. Witnesses are then called by the judge advocate and examined in
much the same manner as in civil practice. After the Government rests, the president advises the accused that he may take the
stand as a sworn witness and be examined the same as any other
witness, or he may make a written or oral unsworn statement.
He, of course, may call witnesses in his defense. When the testimony is in, the judge advocate and counsel usually argue the case
to the court. When the arguments are concluded, the president
closes the court, that is, orders everyone from the courtroom
excepting the members of the court. The court then deliberates
upon the verdict and if it finds the accused guilty, it also fixes
his sentence. The court is then opened and the judge advocate
enters. He alone is advised as to the court's verdict. This concludes the trial, in that the accused is not advised as to the result
until after the case has been reviewed by the convening authority
and the record sent to the judge advocate general at Washington
for further review.
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I hold no brief for the court martial system, but I do want to
record my approval of one feature thereof which impressed me
deeply. I refer to the dignity of the court and the respect which
it demanded and received. The law is a noble profession and the
true lawyer is always seeking to keep his profession on the highest plane possible. He is a molder of public opinion and in a way
stands in a class by himself. He is an officer of the court and
to the general public he represents and stands for law and order.
As he is, so is the community in which he lives. The lawyer who
lives up to the traditions of his profession is a vital factor for
good in the solution of the manifold problems of the age. Anything which suggests a realization of our ideals, will, I am sure,
not be considered offensive. In this article I am voicing only
my personal views and so only because I have the interest of our
bench and bar at heart. You may not agree with me, but at
least know that I am sincere.
In the courts of Wisconsin there is a tendency on the part of
many attorneys to forget the dignity of judicial position and in
many instances a proper respect is not shown in the courtroom.
Power, dignity and intellectual eminence is associated with the
bench. These attributes demand respect, and if we choose men
from among ourselves for judicial positions, it is our duty to pay
them the proper respect and to see to it that the general public
does likewise. It may be urged that the bar does pay the proper
respect. That depends entirely upon how you define the word
"respect". If sprawling over a table when addressing the court;
if presenting papers for signature with coats on and lighted
cigar in hand; if wrangling with the court after an objection has
been ruled upon; if addressing the judge by his Christian name
when on the bench; if talking audibly when a case is on trial; if
these acts show respect, then you are right in saying that the duty
has been well performed, for these acts are of frequent occurrence
in many of the courtrooms of Wisconsin. I admit that there is no
intentional disrespect, but somehow the majesty of the law seems
lacking in a courtroom where these practices are indulged in.
Think of the effect upon spectators. If we ourselves fail to show
the proper respect, how can we expect anything else from the
general public? We cheapen ourselves and our profession if we
do not maintain dignity in the courtroom. Where there is dignity and decorum, the spectator is not only impressed, but his
respect for law and order is thereby increased.
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Too often the doctrine of equality as applied to a democracy
withdraws from the judge those external badges of dignity,
childish as they may appear to the philosopher, but which somehow have power over the imagination of the mass of mankind,
and as Brice, in his American Commonwealth, says: "are not
without a useful reflex influence on the person whom they surround, raising his sense of position and reminding him of his responsibility." Popular sentiment seems to tolerate nothing that
seems to elevate a man above his fellows, even when the dignity is
really the dignity of the people who have put him there. This
country, therefore, would not tolerate the wig and gown of England and I do not care enough for form to wish anything of that
kind either upon the people or the judges, but it has occurred to
me that as a mark of respect to the judges we have chosen, we
could with propriety ask that court be opened each day with some
formality. Personally, I would suggest that the attorneys stand
during the opening of court and not resume their seats until after
the judge has done so. It is a little thing to do and yet I believe
a proceeding of this kind could stimulate in the general public a
greater respect for law and order. Someone may urge that this
is undemocratic, but to my mind such an argument is not sound
when the real meaning of democratic equality is understood.
Democratic equality does not mean equality of intellect, usefulness or position or that all men are equal in person. It does
mean that all men shall have equal opportunities regardless of
birth and that equal justice shall be done to all. It is the ability
to take advantage of the opportunity which distinguishes the successful from the unsuccessful man. All have the same opportunities in a democracy, and if we consider democratic equality
in this light, you will readily appreciate that in doing the thing I
suggest, we are none the less democratic.
Of course, it is true that if judges wish respect, they must
command it, and their own personal conduct in the courtroom
must be such as to uphold the dignity of the court. We want to
help them, but they must co-operate with us to achieve that for
which I earnestly hope - dignity and respect. It may be said that
this idea does not appeal to the judiciary and, therefore, why
worry? My answer is: regardless of their feelings, our natural
pride in our profession should make us want to maintain the dignity of our courts, and we should get home that fact to them
both by our conduct in and out of the courtroom. I feel, however, that our judges are in sympathy with a movement of this
192
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kind, and if they have hesitated to reprimand us for our unlawyerlike habits, that hesitation has been due to a fear of giving offense.
Judges are but human and they are just as anxious to uphold the
dignity of the institution of which we are a part as we are to have
them do it. They welcome suggestions looking to this end.
If we see a court falling into a practice which, if persisted in,
will eventually subject the court to public criticism, it is our duty
as officers of the court to tactfully call attention to it before the
practice becomes an established fact. No judge objects to constructive criticism, particularly where its very purpose is to uphold judicial dignity and force the general public to respect judicial opinion. If we feel that any practice is tending in the slightest way to weaken the court's influence with the general public,
we would be derelict in a duty did we not call the court's attention to that condition, and please remember, I refer only to
judicial practices and not to judicial opinions. Recently our
Supreme Court began the practice of deciding cases without
submitting an opinion. I know the motive which prompts a
practice of this kind. The multiplicity of decisions covering
the same point in our printed reports. Somehow, however,
I feel that such a practice is a serious mistake. I do not
mean to say that in each case decided, the Supreme Court
should file a long, elaborate opinion, but the court could,
in very terse language, state the reason for its ruling and
in many instances could dispose of the case by referring to the
reported case in the Wisconsin Reports controlling its present
action. My reasons for opposing this practice are briefly these:
The men chosen by our citizens for the high office of Supreme
Judge are chosen because the people want a court of last resort.
If they are defeated below, they want to know why they were so
defeated. The right of appeal from time immemorial has always
been encouraged. Very few litigants appeal unless they believe in
the justice of their cause. They employ attorneys to perfect the
appeal and to argue their case. They go to this expense because
they conscientiously believe that they are in the right. Oftentimes a lawsuit is the one big event in a man's life. He lives
with it for the time being and when he exercises his right of
appeal, when defeated, I feel that common courtesy and his right
as a litigant to have stated the reason for his defeat outweighs
every other consideration. The lawyer, of course, knows that the
Supreme Court has read the record and studied the case, but not
so with the layman. He erroneously labors under the impression
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that the Supreme Court has been too indifferent to give him a
fair hearing and he communicates his own views to his friends,
and they to other§, and I say to you very frankly that such action
does not tend to develop that spirit which should exist between
the highest court of the state and the general public. These, of
course, are only my personal views and I am not, as a king, to
coerce anyond to agree with me, but I know human nature tolerably well, and in the end you will find that I am right about this
matter.
Our courts must maintain dignity and we must pay them the
proper respect. As we respect the courts, so will the general
public. If we show disrespect in the courtroom and contempt for
judicial opinon, so will the general public. This contempt, carried far enough, is destructive of law and order and is one of
the things which breeds Bolshevism in the unthinking masses. It
is only by upholding the dignity of the judiciary and compelling
the general public to respect the men we choose as our judges
and ourselves as officers of the court, that we can hope to stamp
out this crawling snake, which is slowly but surely making its
way through the universe. If we uphold our institutions, the
laity will quickly follow.
(EDIToR's NoT'E- This is a revision of an address delivered before the
Milwaukee Bar Association on April ig, x9ig, upon the return of Major
Freeman from Washington, where he served as a member of the Judge
Advocate General's Department.)

